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Thís paper ínvestigates the ínstitutional causes of the 
Japanese Depressíon ín the 1990s ín cornparíson to those of the 
Arne:ríca Great Depressíon ín the 1930s. The Japanese 
Depressíon has two sírnílaríties to the Arnerícan Depressíon. (1) 
Both depressíons followed the bubble econorny. (2) The decades 
of the 1930s and 1990s were hístorícal transítion períods. The 
ínstitutional causes of the bubble econorny in Japan were 
followíng: (1) ínstability of the ínternational rnonetary systern. (2) 
transformation of the financíaL systern frorn “regula디on and 
relíef’ to "deregulation and re.líef." (3) transformation of the 
índustríal relations , (4) the Japanese dornestic ínstitutions such 
as the cross-shareholdíng systern , the tax systern , ‘'the land 
st없ldard，" 밍ld 야le underdeveloped welfare systern. These 
ínstitutional factors are currently obstructing econornic recoveηι 
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I. Introduction 
The Japanese economic situation , which has experienced a long 
depression from the early 1990s to the present‘ can be compared 
to the American Great Depression. The current Japanese depression 
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has two similarities to the American Depression. though Japan has 
never suffered from such a great contraction in this depression as 
the American people experienced between 1929 and 1933. First. 
both depressions occurred after the breakdown of a bubble 
economy. Secondly. the decades of the 1930s and 1990s were 
historical transition periods. As the US economic system could not 
survive the 1930s without drastic transformation. the Japanese 
economic system is facing strong pressure to change from abroad. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare two depressions in order 
to discover the answer to the difficult question “ How should we 
reform our economic system?" 1 will make this comparison from an 
institutional approach. which 1 will explain in this first section. 
A. Institutional Approach 
An institutional approach assumes that stable institutional 
structures are required for favorable capital accumulation. 1 Because 
of several unstable factors in the market economy. we need 
institutions that stabilize a capitalist economy. The first unstable 
factor is the peculiarity of the labor force market. Capital cannot 
produce labor forces. though it can make most of the commodities. 
Therefore. an abundant supply of labor force is indispensable for 
continuous capital accumulation. In addition. capitalists have to 
draw and control workers will to work because labor force has its 
own volition. Accordingly. the institutions that keep labor supply 
and control workers volition are required for stable capital 
accumulation. For example. factory acts were created to keep good 
conditions for workers and they enhanced producti띠ty in England 
in the middle of 19th century. 
A second unstable factor ìs the instability of money. There are 
many currencies in the world. and then exchange rates are not 
always stable. This instability makes capital accumulation fragile. A 
stable international monetary system is required for favorable world 
economic development. The International Gold Standard and the 
pound sterling system stabilized world economies in the 19th 
century. A third unstable factor is the instability of finance. On one 
hand. credit systems and financial markets were developed to 
inspire capital accumulation. On the other hand. however. the 
lThis approach is in debt to the SSA approach (Gordon. Edwards. and 
Reich 1982) 밍1d the Institutional Economics (Commons 1934). 
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financial system is one of the main causes of economic crises. For 
example. in order to protect the credit system from financι al 
instabilit:v. a central banking system was developed as the Lender 
of Last Resort in England in the 19th century. 
As mentioned above , when stable institutions support capital 
accumulation. favorable economlC development is accomplished. 
However. old institutions cannot continue to support capital 
accumulation forever. Innovations transform economic structures 
and development of firm or당anizations also change market 
structures. New economic structures need new institutions. but 
institutions cannot change easily. Therefore. new economic struc-
tures contradict old institutions during historical transition penods. 
Both the American Great Depression and the Japanese Heisei-cra 
Depression occurred during this lransition time. 
In the second section. 1 will analyze the causes of the American 
Great Depression from this institutional approach and e、'olution of 
the instillutional structures after the Great Depression in the United 
States. In the third section , 1 wiJl investigate the evolution of the 
instltutlonal structures in postwar Japan and the institutional 
causes of the Japanese Heisei-era Depression 
11. Great Depression and Modern Capitalism (Shibata 
1997) 
A. lnstitutional Causes oJ the Great Depression 
There were several institutional causes of the American Great 
Depression. First. the superiority of the management over labor 
unions caused the unequal distribution of income. which was a 
fundamental cause of the Great Depression. On one hand. the 
increase in profit margins stimulated the stock market boom. On 
the other hand. the unequal di딩tribution of income depressed lhe 
demand for consumer durable goods and terminated the bubble 
economy 
Secondly. the instability of tbe reconstructed international gold 
standard was also a crucial factor of the Great Depression. Whle 
Britain lIost its place as the strongest financial power after World 
War I. the US did not replace Britain as the international finan C'iaJ 
center though the US became the strongest financial power. As 111(' 
US had an unstable financial svstem inside the countrγ it coulcl 
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not continue foreign investment that was indispensable to 
preserving the intemational gold standard in the 1920s. The stock 
market boom. the stock market crash, and the onset of the Great 
Depression in the US led to a world depression and the breakdown 
of the intemational g이d standard. Then. the onset of world 
depression and the breakdown of the intemational gold standard 
led to worsening of the depression in the United States. In 
particular. 삼le gold outflow from the US in the fall of 1931 
prevented the US economy from recovery. because the Federal 
Reserve adopted a 디ght monetary policy to protect the gold 
standard. We may say that the adherence to old institutions led to 
the deterioration of the weakened economy in the United States. 
Thirdly. the most crucial factor of the Great Depression was the 
institutional instability and fragility of the American financial 
system in the 1920s. The concentration of excess funds on the New 
York Stock Exchange through the correspondent ban퍼ng system 
was not changed fundamen ta11y despite the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve could not control the 
inflow of funds to the stock market. The establishment of a lender 
of last resort did not restrain credit expansion to the stock market 
but supported the specula디on. There was an increase in debts. 
While non-financial firms reduced the debt equity ratio in the 
1920s, real estate mortgage debtors. finance firms such as 
investment trusts and holding companies. stock investors. and 
foreigners increased their debts enormously in the 1920s. On one 
hand. the credit expansion and the stock market boom promoted 
consumption and investment and supported the last boom of the 
1920s. On the other hand ‘ the stock market crash led to debt 
deflation. While the Federal Reserve could prevent the stock market 
crash from extending to the b밍lking crisis. it could not prevent the 
crash from reaching to the debt deflation. Debt deflation caused the 
decline in consump디on. resu띠ng a reduction in investment. 2 Debt 
deflation also led to the banking crisis. which obstructed recovery 
from the depression. 3 
2For a discussion of debt deflation. see Mins찌 (1 986) 
3In addition. the inelas디city of 이igopolis디c pnces was 야le factor that 
accelerated the Great Depression. The decline in the effective demand in the 
f머1 of 1929 led not to a f，떠1 in the p디ce level but to a reduction in 
production and capacity utilization. which led to a decline in investment 
밍ld consump디on. πlUS. 야le inelasticity of oligopolistic prices was the 
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In this way , these three factors were main institutional causes of 
the Great Depression in the United States. Several reforms were 
attempted to deal with these insti t:utional problems in the New Deal 
period. 1 will analyze these reforrns and their consequences in the 
next section. 
B. New Deal R，양onns 
First , the financial reforms succccded in the creation of a new 
financial system. The Federal Reserve System received the power to 
control and regulate speculation in the stock market. The FDIC was 
established to prevent runs on banks. This new financial system of 
“ regulation and relief" was one of the factors that supported .‘the 
g이den a당e of capitalism" after World War II. 
Secondly, the new international monetary and financial system 
was not created in the New Deal era. This was one of the reasons 
why 야le US economy did not r안cover sufficiently from the Great 
Depression. For example , the Federal Reserve adopted a gold 
sterilization policy and raised the reserve requirements of memb E:T 
banks to restrain the inflation that was expected with the imported 
short-term foreign funds in 1936. This 디ght monetary policy was 
the obstacle to an increase in the Federal budget deficit. The tig::1t 
monetary and fiscal policy was one of the causes of the severe 
recession of 1937-8. 
Thirdly , the counter-cyclical function of the Federal budget began 
to work in the second half of the 1930s , because the scale of the 
Federal budget was increased in the New Deal period. In particulεc 
the effect of the rapid decline in effective demand was mitigated by 
an increase in the Federal budget deficit in 1938. However , this 
function was not matured in comparison with that after World War 
11. 
Finally., class relations were transformed drastically owing to the 
rise in class stru잃les ， social movements , and the support of the 
Federal 당overnment in this period. The superiority of the capitalist 
class over the labor class was over. The share of labor income 
recovered in this pe디od. In addition , legisla디on for social reform 
and the protection of small busin당ss and farms was introduced and 
passed into law. However. the cooperation and compromise among 
obstacle to the market mechanism 
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the labor unions. big management. and the Federal govemment 
were not realized. For example. firms faced a profit squeeze and a 
decline in the effective demand. as the wage rate steeply rose and 
the Federal budget deficit sharply declined in 1937. As a result ‘ 
firms decreased investment and the severe recession occurred in 
1937-8. 
In sum. the New Deal reforms succeeded in making some parts 
of a new stable system that was the basis of “ the g이den age of 
capitalism." However. these reforms could not create a sufficient 
recovery from the Great Depression. because these reforms were 
not completed 밍ld social cooperation and coordination was not 
realized in the New Deal period. 
C. Golden Age oJ Modern Capitalísm 
After World War II. new social 밍ld institutional stability was 
created. First. the large scale issues of US securities during World 
War II led to the decrease in the debt asset ratio of the private 
sector. which increased the stability of the American financial 
system that the New Deal reforms created (Minsky 1986). Secondly. 
the international managed monetary system was created. In 
addition. the US began to supply public funds to foreign countries 
as military spending and foreign assistance. which resulted from 
the beginning of the cold war. In other words. Pax Americana was 
created. Thirdly. the counter-cyclical function of the Federal budget 
grew. because the scale of the Federal budget increased enormously 
duríng World War IL 
Fourthly. the Federal govemment succeeded in forcing the 
cooperation and coordination of the labor unions and big business 
as the US economy was organized for the war during World War 11 
(Jacoby 1985). After the World War 11. the system of compromise 
between the labor unions and the bíg business was established 
(Gordon. Edwards. and Reich 1982). Firms could absorb the rise in 
labor cost by the growth of the productiviψ or by a rise in 
products prices. The rise in the labor income increased the effective 
demand. In addition. the development of social welfare also 
increased effective demand. 
In short. these four institutional structures supported “ the golden 
age of modern capitalism." 
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D. New ’Iγansition Era 
However. these four institutional structures came to an end at 
the beginning of the 1970s. Since then. the institutional structures 
have been unstable. First. accelerated in f1ation created the problem 
of lÌnanCÍlal disintennediation. This development made the New Deal 
financial system unstable. As a result. the financial system of 
“ regulation and relief" was transformed to that of “deregula디on and 
relief" through the financial reforms. This system of “deregulation 
and relief" made the problems of moral hazard and increased the 
financial instability and fragility in the 1980s both in the US and 
in the world 
Secondly. Pax Americana has been dedining. The fixed exchange 
rate system collapsed at the beginning of the 1970s. Since then. 
the f10ating exchange rate systern has been one of the factors of 
the international financial instability. The most destabilizing factor 
was that the US has become a debtor country. For example. the 
Japanese easy money p이icy to support t.he dollar exchange rate 
accelerated specula디on in Japan after 1987 
Thirdly. the increase in the Federal budget deficit did not 
promote economic growth but made the stagf1ation in the 1970s. It 
made the US a debtor country. As a result. the counter-cyclical 
function of the Federal budget has been declining since the end 01 
1970s. Fourthly. the system of compromise between the labor 
unions and the big business c밍ne to an end in the 1980s. Firr.:1s 
had not been able to absorb the rise in the labor cost by the 
increase in produc디띠ty or by raising the products prices since the 
end of the 1960s. because of the increase in internation al 
compe디디on and the stagna디on of productivity growth. As a result. 
the compromise system was transformed to the superiority of 
management over labor in the 1980s. 
In sum. the new transition era began in the 1970s. In this era ‘ 
old institutional structures collapsed. However. their replacements 
have not yet been created. 
III. Evolution of the Japanese Institutional Structures 
In this section ‘ 1 will analyze tlle institutional factors of the rapid 
growth and the bubble economy ín Japan. 
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A. Institutional Causes oJ the Japanese Rapid Growth (Shib따Q 
1998) 
From the beginning of the 1950s to the early 1970s, the 
Japanese economy experienced dramatic gro\\πh ， Several institu-
tional structures sustained this rapid growth. 
First, the stable international environment accelerated Japan’S 
economic growth. Pax Americana, and in particular the IMF dol1ar 
system , encouraged 없ld sustained rapid gro\\πh in Japan. In 
contrast to the interwar period. the United States fulfilled its 
responsibilities as the key currency country by distribu디ng dollar 
funds on a massive scale under the Marshall Plan to assist in the 
recovery of Europe after World War 11. While an Asian Marshall 
Plan never materialized. the United States intervened in the Korean 
War, resul디ng in a large disσibu디on of dollar funds as a “ special 
procurement" and in other forms in Asia, inclu며ng Japan. The 
enormous level of “ special procurement" income raised the ceiling of 
the Japanese balance of payments and helped the recovery of its 
economy. 
In addition , the IMF dollar system supported the high rate of 
growth in the world economy, which was beneficial for rapid growth 
in Japan. Even though the Japanese economy’s dependence on 
intemational trade was lower after World War II than before , its 
dependence on the world economy was still high. The expansion in 
world trade was the chief factor in the growth of Japan ’s exports 
during this period. Because all foreign currency eamed from 
exports was spent on imports to expand produc디on and achieve 
high growth , the increase in exports made rapid gro\\πh possible. 
Another benefit in the intemational environment was the availability 
of cheap and stable supplies of raw materials and ener양T needed 
for heavy and chemical industrtalization (e.g .. Nakamura (1995. pp. 
45, 64, 68)). 
Secondly, the stable financial system maintained rapid growth. In 
those days. 야le corporate sector showed a huge shortage of funds. 
which was made up by the surplus in the household sector. City 
banks attracted deposits from the individual sector and supplied 
funds to keiretsu firms through loans. This “ indirect finance" was a 
main route of the supplies of funds during 삼le rapid growth period. 
As the banks were bold in supplying funds through “ over loan ," 
which means the high loan deposit ratio. they had to depend upon 
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the fund supply of the central bank. Under these conditions , the 
Bank of Japan could control not only the financial system , but tlle 
Japanese economy 상1fough its monetary policy. During periods of 
economic growth , the Bank of Japan supplied funds through loans 
and open market opera디ons ， which encouraged rapid growth. On 
the other hand , when economic booms led to balance of payments ‘ 
deficits , which decreased the foreign exchange reserves. tight 
monetary policies were effective in restric디ng fund supplies ‘ 
suppress:lng domestic demand , and wiping out those deficits 
(Nakamura 1995 , pp. 139-41). 
Thirdly , the Japanese-style corporate system , including the stable 
and flexible industrial relations , maintained rapid gro\\πh. In the 
lar당e firms , male workers were members of the company labor 
unions and generally worked for the same company until a 디xed 
retirement age under the seniority system. They received relatively 
high pay, including fringe benefits , and were promised compara-
tively equal advancement. After the defeat of the anti-rationalization 
strikes in the 1950s , the main concerns of the company labor 
unions were job security, wage , and shorter working hours. On one 
hand , the higher wages achieved by the company labor unions 
expandecl the domestic consumption markets , which encouraged 
rapid growth (Nakamura 1995 , pp. 30-32 , 155-6). On the other 
hand , the large firms could raise the org없liza디onal capability and 
labor produc디vity by including male blue-collar workers in business 
activities (Lazonick 1992; and Hashimoto 1996, p. 6). In addition. 
there were a considerable number of temporary workers and day 
laborers with limited periods of employment in both large 밍ld small 
firms. They could reduce numbers of temporary workers and day 
laborers easily in response to business fluctuations (Nakamura 
1995. p. 158). 
Fourthly, the govemment and its related institutions played an 
impor떠nt role in rapid growth , while the efforts of the privécte 
sector, in particular industry, mainly produced economic gro\\끼 h. 
The policy system for the protection and fostering of industly , 
includin당 administrative guidance , encouraged private investmen t. 
Additionally, the increase in fiscal spending in prosperous periods 
encouraged economic growth. as the fiscal policies of this period 
reversed the principle of counter-cyclic외 management. Moreover , 
the lending of national funds accumulated through the various 
national institutions (postal sa띠ngs ， the welfare and national 
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pension funds , and post office life insurance premiums) to the 
basic industries , small businesses , and households fostered the 
exp없lsion of business investment 없ld residential construction (e.g .. 
Nakamura (1 995, pp. 87-9 1, 125-35)). 
These four institutional structures , which were paπly created 
intentionally and partly emerged spon얹neously， supported and 
encouraged economic growth in the 1950s and the 1960s in Japan. 
B. Institutional Causes oJ the Japanese Economic Growth in the 
19705 and the 19805 (Shibata 1998) 
In the beginning of the 1970s, steady economic growth in 
developed countries ceased. First. intemational institutions became 
unstable because of the decline in Pax Arnericana. The fixed 
exchange rate system collapsed, and the price of crude oil was 
raised drastically. The floating exchange rate system was one of the 
main factors of the intemational economic and financial instabil-
ities. The rise in the crude oil price created a serious condition for 
oil-impor디ng countries. Second, many developed countries had to 
face the serious problem that we had never expe디enced before 
“ stagflation." Japan , however , succeeded in keeping a better 
economic performance than any other developed country during the 
second half of the 1970s and through the first half of the 1980s. 
Why could Japan get over the “ Nixon shock" and two “oil crises?" 
Why could Japan deal successfully with “stagfla디on?" 
The most important institutional factor causing the Japanese 
economic success in this period was the flexibility of the Japanese 
corporate system. After the first oil crisis , the Japanese economy 
faced a serious trilemma: inflation. balance of payments’ deficits. 
and stagna디on. The Japanese government was forced to adopt 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to restrain inflation for two 
years. These anti-inflation p이icies were accompanied by great 
sacrifices. The firms' profits fell drastically due to a decrease in 
demand and an increase in costs. 
Japanese firms reduced the numbers of employees and reduced 
labor costs. First of all. they dismissed their temporary female 
workers and their part-디me workers , who were mainly housewives 
As most of them did not remain in the labor market but retumed 
to the home , they were not counted as “ completely unemployed." In 
addition , Japanese firms avoided large reductions in their work 
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forces by dismissing specific workers in order to maintain their 
traditionally good labor-management relations. They tried to use 
every imaginable device to redu c:e employment without dismissal 
from leaving positions of re디rin딩: employees unfilled to reshuffling 
personnel; transfering employees to other companies; and calling for 
voluntaηT resignation. 
They also made efforts to economize on labor-related expenses. 
They switched from male to female employees. in particular. 
low-wagε part-time workers. In addition. management gained the 
cooperat:ion of company labor unions in order to hold down annual 
wage increases to a level only slightly more than the rate of 
increase in the consumer price index. In sum. Japanese industrial 
firms were able to reduce empl아ment. trim their total wage costs 
without a surge in the unempl이ment rate. and avoid social 
conflict. As a result. the Japanese government did not have to 
adopt growth-promoting policy until 1977. when the expectation of 
inflation ceased. 
The second reason for the Japanese success in economic gro\\1h 
in the 1970s and the 1980s was the expansion in exports. The 
increase in net exports expanded the real GDP by around ]-2 
percent during the period between 1974 and 1977. The U.S. 
government adopted growth-promoting monetary and fiscal policles 
and provided the stimulus for a world economic recovery as a 
locomotive of world economic gro\\πh. The expansion in exports 
supported economic gro\\πh again in the first half of the 1980s. 
The increase in net exports helped the Japanese economy recover 
from the slump of 1980-2 (BOJ 1997). 
C. Causes oJ the Bubble Economy in Japan (Shibata & Kaneko 
1999.1 
a) Instability of the Intemational Monetary System 
The international monetaπ system has been unstable since the 
beginning of the 1970s. when the fixed foreign exchange system 
collapsecl because of the decline in Pax Americana. There has been 
no mechanism ihat forced the United States to reduce its deficit in 
the balance of intemational payments in the floating exchange 
system. The United States has benefited by having the dollar as a 
key currency. As a result. the dollar exchange rate against the 
mark and the yen had been declining since the 1970s. The 
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automatic self-correc디ng mechanism of the floating foreign exchange 
rate system on the international balance of payments did not work 
as some economists had an디cipated. While the exchange rates of 
strong currencies rose. those of weak currencies declined in the 
late 1970s. The fluctuations of the foreign exchange rates 
sometimes overshot in this pe디od. 
The Reagan administration adopted Reaganomics. the pillars of 
which are tax cuts and restriction of the inflation rate at the 
beginning of the 1980s. However. as it failed to cut the federal 
government expenditure. the tax reduction greatly increased the 
federal deficits. The combination of deficit increase with the 
anti-inflation policy led to the interest rate rise. High interest rates 
absorbed a lot of capital from abroad 밍ld made the dollar 
exchange rate higher. The strong dollar caused the decline in 
American industries competitive power and increased the trade and 
current balance deficits. Consequently, the twin deficits in federal 
public finance and the current balance of payments were 
tremendously augmented. 
A huge amount of capital import financing the twin-deficits 
converted the American international investment position from the 
largest creditor to the largest debtor. The increase in the debtor 
position of the key currency country made the international 
monetary system fragile. The expansion in the debtor position of 
the United States deteriorated its international balance of payments. 
Some economists warned that it was difficult for the United States 
to continue to sustain the twin-deficits by the capi떠1 import 
(Krugman 1985). Other economists worried about an international 
financial crisis , which might occur by a capital flight from the 
United States.4 On one hand, the financial deregula디on 밍ld 
globalization encouraged capital impoπ to the United States and 
supported the strong dollar in the first half of the 1980s. On the 
other hand , they stimulated the mobility of hot money and made 
the international monetary system fragile. 
In order to take precautions against the international financial 
crisis and to depress protectionism in the United States , the 
international financial agreement to decrease the dollar exch없1ge 
rates against the yen and the mark was made in the New York 
Plaza Hotel in the f.머1 of 1985. The dollar exchange rates dropped 
~or further details of the “ Hard 닝nding Scenario." see Marris (1 985). 
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abruptly after this agreement. Iiowever. the deficit in the U.S. 
current balance of payments continued to expand until 1987. T :le 
factors of this expansion are following. (1) The Japanese exporting 
industries tried to minimize the dollar price increase by the 
rationalization. (2) The American oligopolis디c industries raised the 
price of their products. (3) The American exports to the Latin 
American countries. which suffered from the debt crises. did not 
grow. (4) The Japanese dollar surplus and the American deficit in 
the current balance increased temporarily because of the reverse J 
curb effect. 
As the decline in the dollar exchange rates could not decrease 
the American current balance deficit. there was a strong fear that 
the dollar drop might lead to an intemational financial crisis 
Therefore. international financi::니 cooperation was decided to 
support the dollar exchange rates in the 1ρuvre Summit in the 
spring of 1987. However. this agreement was imperfect. The Federal 
Bank in West Germany would not adopt an easy money policy to 
support the dollar because its priority was to restrain inflation. 
Mter thi잉 intemational disagreem당nt was reported in the summer of 
1987. the prices of stocks and bonds and the dollar exchange rates 
dropped in New York on October 20. which was called the Black 
Monday. The Fed supplied liquidity to the market to support the 
price levels of stocks and bonds as the lender of last resort. In 
order to support the dollar international financial coopera디.)n 
resulted. 
The most coopera디ve country was Japan. The Japanese moneta.ry 
authorities had three incentives to support the dollar exchange rate 
against the yen. (1) It was import밍lt for the Japanese expor디ng 
industries to prevent the declim‘ in the dollar rate to keep their 
price competitiveness. (2) An easy money policy to support the 
dollar was consistent with the countermeasure to the recessiDn 
made by the yen rise. (3) The stable dollar was essential for the 
international monetary system. 
The Bank of Japan reduced its bank rate to 2.5% on February 
23 in 1!)87 and kept it until the end of May in 1989. Because the 
Japanese monetary authorities purchased the dollar in order to 
support it, the Jap없lese gold and foreign exchange reserves 
increased rapidly from $26.5 b i1lion at the end of 1985 to $100.4 
billion at the end of April in HJ89 (BOJ 1998).5 As a result. the 
growth rate of the Japanese monetary base rose in 1986 and kept 
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high until 1989. The growth rate of the money supply in Japan 
was also elevated in the late 1980s. 
In sum , the intemational financial cooperation to support the 
weak dollar created the oversupply of intemational liquidity in the 
world , especially in Japan , in the late 1980s. This situation was 
similar to that in the late 1920s. 
b) Transformation of the Financial Institutional Structure 
In the Japanese rapid growth period, a huge surplus of savings 
in the household sector was absorbed by the non-financial 
corporate sector , which invested enormous funds in plant and 
equipment. The b밍lking sector attracted deposits from the 
individual sector and supplied funds to keiretsu firms through 
loans. The ceiling for interest on deposits was set by the 
Emergency Interest Rate Adjustment Law. This regulated indirect 
finance was a main route of the supplies of funds during 삼lis 
period. Mter the oil crisis , however , this stable financial structure 
was transformed into unstable one. The shortage of savings in the 
non-financial corporate sector shrank because of the decline in 
fixed business investment. Instead of the corporate sector , the 
public sector absorbed lots of savings from the household sector in 
the late 1970s. Mter 1978 the Japanese govemment began to 
expand fiscal expenditure to restrain the yen from risin당 under the 
pressure of the United States , which asked the Japanese govern 
ment to support the world economy as a locomotive engine (Table 
1, Shibata 1998). 
The Japanese government had to increase government bond 
issues to finance the fiscal expenditure in the late 1970s. This 
expansion in government bond issues had a great impact on the 
Japanese financial structure. Until that time , the bulk of 
government bond issues had been underwritten by a syndicate of 
many city and regional banks and reabsorbed a year later in a 
buying operation by the Bank of Japan in order to guard against 
any fé'니1 in government bond prices. With the very large government 
5Go1d and foreign exchange reserves of some other developed countries 
also increased in this period. They increased from $13.6 billion at the end 
of 1985 to $45.0 billion at the end of 1988 in the U.K. and from $3.3 
billion to $16.2 billion in Canada in the s와ne period. They also expanded 
from $48.0 billion at the end of 1985 to $83.5 billion at the end of 1987 in 
the West Germany (BOJ 1993. p. 158). 
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TABLE 1 
SAVINGS-INVESTMENT BALANCE 8Y SECTOR [N JAPAN 
(Ra디o to GDP. %) 
Sector 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 19E:8 
-72 -75 -78 -81 -84 -87 -90 
Non-fmance corporation -8.7 -11.3 -4.9 -5.7 -4.1 -4.3 -7.5 
Financial ins디tutions 0.8 0 .8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 - 1.0 -1.‘3 
General govemment 0.8 -0.8 -4.0 -4.1 -2.7 -0.1 2 .. 3 
NPO 0.2 0 .3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Household sector 8.8 10 .8 9.6 13.3 8.6 8.9 8.5 
Overseas sector -1.9 0.4 - 1.3 0.5 -2.0 -3.8 -1. 3 
Statistical error -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.δ 
Source: Economic Planning Agency. J(okumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo {National 
Economil: Accounts Annual ReportJ. Current Issues. 
bond issues of the time. however. it was no longer possible lo 
implement such control. and government bonds started to circula te 
on the bond markets. Bond price formation was deregulated. and 
soon government bond yields were set at the level of long-terrn 
interest rates. This eventu외ly crealed the condition for the market-
ing of new financia1 products like medium-term government bond 
funds and bond investment trusts. ln order to compete with these 
new products the Japanese banks developed several kinds of 
products such as certificates of deposit (CD). maturity-designated 
deposits and money-market certificate (MMC). ln this way. they 
increased their dependence on 냐le unregulated fund raising 
markets (Nakamura 1995). 
The shortage of savings in the public sector. however. contracted 
in order to reduce the deficit in 야le public finance in the 1980s. 
Instead. a surplus of sa까ngs in the household sector was directed 
to the overseas sector. High interest rates in U1e United States a nd 
deregulation of Japanese internationa1 financia1 transactions en -
couraged the Japanese financia1 institutions to invest in American 
securities. During the first half of the 1980s foreign currency 
deposits and impact loans were deregulated. a yen-based BA 
market and a Euro-yen len띠ng market were established. inve!,t -
ment in overseas securities was deregulated. and foreign-currency-
denominated 없ld Euro-yen bonds were authorized (Nakamura 
1995). As a result. a huge 없nount of the Japanese capit외 export 
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went to the United States in the 1980s6 and Japan became the 
largest creditor in the world. However. as the dollar exchange rate 
dropped after 1985. the Japanese institutional investors suffered 
from heavy capital losses in securities investment. The Japanese 
securities investment in the United States shrank after 1987. 
because of the increase of the risk premium. 
In addition. the Japanese banks increased short-term borrowing 
in foreign currencies from abroad to extend Impact 1ρans to 
non-bank firms in Japan. The Japanese firms not only invested in 
foreign securities. but also expanded domestic investment. They 
also increased issue of the Euro-dollar bonds with warrants in the 
late 1980s when the cost of equi낀-related bond issues were 
inexpensive because of high stock prices in Japan (Shibata 1993). 
Accordingly. the shortage of savings in the overseas sector declined 
after 1987. Instead. the non-bank corporate sector expanded the 
shoπage of savings again in the late 1980s (Table 1). However. the 
stable financial structure in the rapid gro\\πh period did not 
reappear. 
First. banks increased their dependence on the unregulated fund 
raising markets πable 2). This increase caused the rise in the fund 
raising cost. Then banks had to operate these funds with higher 
rates. Secondly. large non-financial enterprises diversified their fund 
raising routes. They could raise lots of funds by issuing securities. 
especially stocks. convertible bonds. bonds with warrants attached. 
and yen-denominated foreign bonds in the late 1980s (Table 3). 
Accordingly banks had to find new borrowers. On one hand ‘ they 
reduced the shares of loans to manufacturing industries and large 
firms. On the other hand. they expanded the shares of loans to 
real estate. finance and insurance industries. and small enterprises. 
The share of housing 10없1S was also expanded. 
ln this period. the non-financial c{πporate sector expanded 
financial liabilities rapi버y because of the increase in borrowings 
from banks and bond issues. On the other hand. financial assets 
of this sector expanded faster than its liabilities because of the 
increase in values of stocks and investment trusts. As a result. the 
bJapan’s foreign securities investments increased after 1984. paπicularly 
in 1986. when the restrictions on the Japanese financial institutions 
investments in foreign bonds were relaxed to stem the rapid 끼se of the yen 
exchange rate against the dollar (Shibata 1993). 
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TABLE 2 
OUTSTAND매G IN SHoRT-TE:RM MONEY MARKETS 
(End of the Year. Trillion Yen. 'Yo) 
Ratio 
1975 1980 1986 1990 1997 1975 1980 1986 1990 1997 
lnterbank 
markets 
6.7 9.8 23.7 41.1 49.6 78.8 58.7 42.2 24.4 23.9 
Call market 2.3 4.1 10.2 24.0 39.3 27.1 24.6 18.1 14.3 189 
(U ncollateralized) (-) (-) (1.6) (1 2.3) (30.6) ( -) ( -) (2.8) (7.3) (14.8) 
Bills market 4.4 5.7 13.5 17.1 10.3 51.8 34.1 24.0 10.2 50 
Open market 1.8 6.9 32.5 127.2 157.8 21.2 41.3 57.8 75.6 76 1 
Bond repo market 1.8 4.5 7.1 6.6 10.0 21.2 26.9 12.6 3.9 48 
CD 2.4 9.9 18.9 38.6 14.4 17.6 11.2 186 
CP - 15.8 12.0 9.4 5.8 
JOM 15.5 85.9 97.2 27.6 51.0 46.9 
Total 8.5 16.7 56.2 168.3 207.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: JOM means Japan Offshore Market. 
Source: BOJ (1998). 
financial positlon of this sector improved. The financial positlon of 
the personal sector also irnproved in thls per1od. While its 
borrowings expanded enorrnously. its assets. especially values of 
stocks and investment trusts increased more than its liabilitles did. 
In additlon. tangible assets. ln paπicular. land values increased 
quickly until the end of the 1980s. πlerefore it seems reasonable 
to suppose that the bulk of bank loans went for speculation cm 
stocks and lands in the late 1980s. 
In short. financlal deregulation and intemational1zation made the 
Japanese fmancial structure fragile. Dur1ng the first h려f of this 
decade. Japans capi떠1 export to the United States supported tlle 
strong doll하. After 1987. however. Japans money returned home 
and went to the hi방ùy speculatlve markets. Persona1 and busineßs 
sectors accumulated ftnancia1 l1abllities. depen벼ng upon the 
apprecia디on of assets. Exp깅lsion of bank loans was hist0r1ca11y 
unusua1.7 After the economic bubble burst and prices of stocks 
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TABLE 3 
FuND RAISING BY CORPORATE BUSINESS SECTOR 
(Year Average. Trillion Yen. %) 
Total Borrov From From Secu- Indus- Stocks Exter- CP For-
-lng Prlvate Publlc r1tles tr1al n외 eign 
F.1. F.1. Bonds Bonds Credit 
64-69 5.9 5.0 4.4 0 .5 0.7 0.2 0 .5 0 .0 0.0 0 .2 
70-75 15.8 13.6 12.4 1.2 1.7 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
76-80 15.1 12.5 10.8 1.7 2.1 0.7 1.2 0.2 0.0 0 .4 
81-83 22.3 19.3 17.2 2 .1 3 .4 0 .7 1.9 0.8 0 .0 -0 .4 
84-86 29.5 24.0 23.1 1.0 5 .3 1.0 2 .2 2.1 0.0 0 .2 
87-89 56.6 35.3 3 1.2 4 .1 14.2 1.8 6 .5 5 .9 4.4 2.8 
90-92 44.1 32.8 25.2 7.6 9.4 3.7 2 . 1 3 .7 -0.3 2 .2 
93-96 8.6 3 .6 0 .0 3 .7 3 .3 4.4 1. 1 -2.2 -0.4 2.1 
64-69 100.0 84.8 75.7 9 .1 12.3 3 .8 8 .3 0 .3 0.0 2.8 
70-75 100.0 86.1 78.3 7.8 11.0 4.2 6.5 0.3 0.0 2.9 
76-80 100.0 83.0 7 1.6 11.3 14.2 4.7 7 .9 1.6 0.0 2 .8 
81 -83 100.0 86.5 76.9 9.6 15.2 3 .0 8.5 3.7 0.0 -1.7 
84-86 100.0 8 1.4 78.1 3.3 18.0 3 .5 7.3 7.2 0.0 0.6 
87-89 100.0 62.4 55.2 7.3 25.0 3.2 11.5 10.3 7.7 4 .9 
90-92 100.0 74.3 57. 1 17.2 2 1.3 8.3 4 .7 8.3 -0.7 5 .0 
93-96 100.0 42.2 -0.3 42.5 37.8 5 1.0 12.5 -25.7 -4.5 24.5 
Note: F.1. Means Financial Institutions. 
Source: BOJ (1998) . 
and lands dropped drastically. the fm없lci외 posi디on of these two 
sectors deteriorated seriously and banks had to accumulate bad 
assets. 
c) Transformation of Industrial Relations 
Nikkeiren. 삼le Japan Federation of Employers Association. 
advocated “ the principle of labor productivi양 standard ... which 
meant 삼1at wage increases were to be controlled within the rise of 
labor producti띠양. As large labor unions like IMF.JC accepted this 
principle. nominal wages rose in accordance with nominal 
7The ratio of bank loans to the GNP exp따lded rapi버y from 0.52 at the 
end of 1982 to 0 .96 at the end of 1989 in Japan (BOJ 1993). In contrast. 
the same ratio increased slightly from 0 .36 at the end of 1923 to 0.42 at 
the end of 1928 in the United States (BMS 1943; and HS 1975). 
A.MERICAN AND JAPANESE DEPRESSION COMPARED 103 
produc디vity in m밍1Ufacturing industries since then. On one hand. 
the introduction of this principlc:‘ was an important factor which 
preventecl stagf1ation from proceeding. On the other hand. howev(~r. 
this principle was a remote cause of land speculation. 
First, latent capital gains of lands are not included in tne 
produc디on of added value. though services on the land transactio :1s 
are includecl in GDP. Therefore. the increases in latent gains of 
lands are not re f1ected in the wage increases. For example. whlle 
the book value of lands owned by the corporate sector was 110.5 
t디llion-yen in 1988. the value of latent gains was 342 trillion-yen. 
which was almost equivalent to the GDP. If latent capital gains of 
lands and stocks had been included in the denominator. the 
distribution rate of labor income might have dropped. although this 
rate did not change really after the oil crisis. Secondly. even if 
current profit rates of corporations had been used as a standard of 
wage increases. the same problεm would have occurred. Because 
latent capital gains of lands were not included in profits and 
interests of borrowings for buying lands were deducted from profits , 
nominal profits became compre상sed. Therefore borrowing to b 니y 
lands restrained wage increases (Kaneko 1991).8 
As mentioned above. the Japanese bubble economy in the late 
1980s had several similar characteristics to the American bubble 
economy in the la1.e 1920s. Instability of the international monetary 
system was a salient cause of both bubble economies. The 
American easing of monetary policy to support the fragile pound in 
1927 accelerated stock speculation in the United States. The 
Japanese easy-money policy to sustain the weak dollar in the late 
1980s stimulated speculation on lands and stocks. Accordingly 
mistakes of monetary policy were not important factors in both 
bubble economies.9 
SeconcUy. fragility of financial structure was also a remarkahle 
factor in both bubble economies. Because non-financial firms 
reduced the debt equity ratio in accordance with the decline in 
EThe growth rate of nominal wage exceeded the growth rate of labor 
productivity in the rapid growth period (Figure la). In contrast , the former 
exceeded the latter in the second half of the 1980s (Figure lb). 
9For Example. Horiuchi (1 998) criticized the Japanese policy mix of 
easy • money policy and tight fiscal policy. He overlooked that Japan'ose 
authorities had to adopt this policy mix in order to suppoπ the dollar 
exchange rate against the yen from 1987 (0 1989 
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FIGURE lB 
INDEXES OF NOMINAL WAGE AND LABOR PRODUCfIVI1Y 
(1975 AVERAGE- 100) 
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their fixed investment, the American banks lost influential borrow-
ers. Then. their assets were shifted from commercial loans to more 
speculative assets , such as real estate mortgage loans , security 
collateral loans. and securities investments in the late 1920s. In 
the late 1980s the Japanese banks also shifted their assets to 
speculative ones. as they lost good borrowers. 
Thirdly. unequal distribution 이. wealth occurred in both bubble 
economies. In the late 1920s. as the increase rate of labor 
productivity exceeded that of wa원es. the share of profits in added 
values increased in the United States. As a result ‘ dividend 
payments expanded and stock prices appreciated. In contrast. ìn 
the 1980s the distribution rate of labor income did not decline and 
the distribution rate of profits di뼈 not increase in Japan. However. 
the latent capital gains of stocks and lands owned by corporate 
firms expanded and the unequal distribution of assets was 
developecl in the late 1980s. 
Although there were three similarities in both bubble economies. 
there were 외so several differences between the two bubble 
economies. First. the Unitecl States hacl a special privilege to 
finance its balance of payments cleficits by paying its domestic 
currency after the 1970s. As a result. it accumulatecl twin deficits 
in the 1980s and created the excessive supply of liquiclity in the 
worlcl. In contrast. the UK did not have same kind of pri띠lege. 
because it adopted the gold standard in the 1920s. Therefore. the 
specula디on overheated more excessively in the 1980s than in the 
1920s in the world. 
Secondly. the trend of deregula디on and globaliza디on in the 
financial markets made the financial system fragile and speculative 
after the 1970s. The financial system of “ regulation ancl relie r‘” 
which was createcl in the New Deal era. was transformecl to that of 
“deregula디on and relief" 야1fough the financial reforms. In fact. the 
system of “deregula디on 하ld relief" prevented the financial crisis 
from occurring. On the other hand. however. this system caused 
the problem of moral hazard and accelerated speculation in the 
1980s both in the United States and in the world. By contrast. 
there existed the financial system of “ deregulation and limited 
relief" in the United States during the second decade of this 
century. 
Thirdly. the expansion of the Jap없lese banking loans in the 
1980s was much larger than that of the American banking loans in 
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the 1920s and the 1980s. In addition. specula디ons were developed 
in the different markets between in the United States and in 
Japan. In the United States. speculations were developed in stock 
and commercial real estate markets in the 1920s and the 1980s. 
By contrast. in Japan. speculations were developed in land markets 
in the 1980s. Why did the Japanese banks expand their loans 
rapidly in the 1980s? Why was land specula디on overheated ln this 
period? Let us examine other domestic institutional causes of the 
Jap밍lese bubble economy in the fo11o삐ng section. 
d) Other Domestic Institutional Causes of the Japanese Bubble 
Economy 
As a beginning. we will examine several features of land markets 
in the rapid groVlπh period. First. the growth rate of real GNP 
followed the growth rate of real land prices with a short delay until 
the 1960s. Secondly. 삼le gro‘.vth rate of real land prices and real 
anticipated interest rates fluctuated in the same pattem from the 
1960s to the oil shock. Thirdly. the p디ces of housing land almost 
correlated positively with new housing constructions (Figure 2). 
Jud밍ng from the above there e엄sted 단le following cycle in the 
rapid growth period. (1) Firms invested in pl밍lt 없ld equipment 밍ld 
created the economic growth under the conditions of an 
easy-money policy. (2) Income growth increased the demand for 
personally owned houses. (3) This rise in the demand for houses 
increased the GNP and boosted land prices up. 
This cycle was transformed in the early 1970s. (1) The groVl엔1 
rate of real land price correlated nega디vely with the growth rate of 
real GNP until 1985. (2) The growth rate of real land prices also 
correlated negatively with the anticipated real interest rate until 
1985. (3) New housing construction correlated negatively with the 
l밍ld prices after 1970. (4) The construction of houses for rent led 
to the rise in housing construction after 1986 (Figure 3). As 
mentioned above. we may say that the demand for person허ly 
owned houses was not a main cause of the rise in land prices after 
the 1970s. Then. what was the main cause of the rise in land 
prices? Judging from the fact that the corporate firms purchase of 
lands positively correlated with the growth rate of land p디ces. it 
seems reasonable to suppose that corporate firms purchases of 
lands led to the rise in land prices. which influenced housing 
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FIGURE 3 
NEW DWELLING CONSTRUcrlON STARTEO (1 ,000 UNITS) 
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construction after the 1970s. Corporate firms reduced investment in 
plant and equipment. and expanded purchases of lands after the 
oil shock. Considering this. then. let us examine the institutional 
factors , which encouraged corporate firms to expand the purchases 
of lands. 
The first institutional factor was the Japanese cross-shareholding 
system. The Japanese firms created this system in order to stand 
against the trend of foreign mergers 없ld acquisitions. and resulted 
in shut디ng out the inf1uence of foreign shareholders. Accordingly 
the incentive for the Japanese firms to increase the ratio of 
short-term profit to investment and dividend payments to 
shareholders was reduced. Growth of firms assets itself was the 
primary objective. As a result. the firms compressed the short-term 
profits to expand their assets. lnvestment in land assets was the 
best way for this purpose. because of belief in continuous rise of 
land values. 
The 떠x system was the second institutional factor. As the 
interest payments of borrowing for land purchases could be 
accounted as losses. firms could compress profits and save in 
corpora디on tax payments. In addition , latent capital gains were not 
taxed. as the prime cost was used in the accoun디ng. As a result, 
the firms could streng삼len their fund raising power on the bases of 
these latent capital gains. Mter December 1988. the interest 
payments of borrowing were not accounted as losses for four years 
after the purchases of unused lands. The restriction of land 
mortgage loans was also stren!안hened. However. the firms 
continued to purchase lands to construct corporate welfare facilities 
because the fringe benefits were not taxed. 
Furthermore. when firms sold lands to other firms with 
repurchase agreement after two or three years. sales revenue was 
treated as borro뻐ng. Many firms used this way to be exempted 
from capital gains tax on land transfer and inheritance tax. As a 
result. deficit corporate enterprises increased rapidly in the 1980s 
(K밍leko 1991: 밍ld Kaneko and Mori 1993). Not only c아porate firms 
but also individuals used these ways to save in inheritance 떠X 
payments. Although stocks were evaluated on the basis of market 
values. lands were evaluated on the basis of appraised values. 
which were about 70 per cent of market values. In addition. 
small-sized lands (sm려ler than 200 square meters) were evaluated 
as a half of appraised values. Accordingly, it was profitable to 
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purchase small-sized lands in order to save in inheritance tax 
payment잉. 
Thirdly. there existed the system that latent capital gains of 
lands push stock prices up. The stock prices of firms were raised 
by the increase in latent capital gains of lands that they owned. 
This mechanism made the cross-딘hareholding system advantageous. 
Fourthly. there existed the system that an increase in latent capital 
gains of stocks expanded banks ability of credit creaUon. When L:1 e 
BIS capital adequacy guidelines were adapted in Japan. tne 
Japanese authorities decided that the percentages of latent capital 
gains of stocks held by banks were to be included in their m:m 
capital. We can call this system the land standard instead of t:1e 
gold standard . As a result. the fì이lowing speculative cycle was 
developed in the late 1980s. <Ris.e in land prices• increase in stock 
pnces • increase in banks own capital• expansion of land mortgage 
loans• rise in land prices). 
The fifth institutional factor ()f the bubble economy was the 
Japanese welfare system that included weak land and housing 
policies. Because of the underdeveloped social security system. in 
particular. the insufficient pension system. the Japanese wanted to 
0\\π1 their land as a safe and profitable asset. As the restricUons of 
land use in city planning were unsa디sfactory in Japan. prices of 
lands for housing rose in the cities. In addition. the Japanese 
housing policies encouraged people to own their houses. 
Construction of public houses and public subsidies to house rent 
were unsatisfactory. After the 1970s the policy encouraging people 
to purchase their houses was stl'engthened. The Public Corporation 
increased construction of apartment houses for sale in lots. The 
Housing Finance Corporation exp없1ded housing loans. These 
policies accelerated land prices and caused the Land Myth that 
land prices never declined. 
Under these domestic institutions mentioned above. small 
non-manufacturing enterprises expanded their borro뼈ng in order to 
purchase lands. In par디cular. small finns. which had Iess than a 
hundred million yen of capital in the service industries. including 
commodiity lease 밍1d finance industries. aggressively increased land 
purchases. Not only corporate enterp디ses but also individuals 
increased their demand of real estate assets by the end of the 
1980s (Figure 4). They increased investment in one-room apartment 
houses for rent in order to save in their tax payments in this 
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FIGURE 4 
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깐le Japanese domestic instltutions mentioned above supported 
the stren항h of the Jap하lese economy after the oil shock. First. the 
cross-shareholding system could suppress 야le pressure of 
shareholders to ask for an increase in short term profits. As a 
result. corporate firms could make long term investment plans. 
Secondly. corporate firms used latent capital gains of stocks and 
1없lds as a shock absorber. For example. they could llÙtigate the 
decline in their profits by re떠izing latent capita1 gains during the 
oil shock and the hi양l-yen recession. Thirdly. they could mi디gate 
the deterioration of their financial position by the increase in latent 
capi얹1 gains even if their earnings declined. 
These Japanese domestlc institutions helped the Japanese 
economy to recover from the high-yen recession and created boom 
economy by the end of 삼le 1980s. After the bubble burst. however , 
l~he numbers of new housing consσuction increased in the late 1980s 
(Figure 3). πle rate of increase in construction of houses for rent. in 
paπicu1ar. smaller than 30 square meters. was very high (EPA 1993). 
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they became the sources of the vicious circle. We will examine the 
mechanism of overheating and breakdown of the bubble economy. 
D. Overheating and Breakdown qf the Bubble Economy 
As we have seen , the institutional causes of the Japanese bubble 
economy in the late 1980s were fi이lowing. (1) Instability of the 
intemational monetary system , (2) transformation of financial 
institutions from “regula디on and relief" to “deregula디on and relief," 
(3) transformation of industrial relations and unequal distribution of 
wealth , (4) the Jap와lese domestic institutions such as the 
cross-shareholding system , the tax system to stimula디ng borrowing 
for land speculation , ‘ the land standard ," and the underdeveloped 
welfare system. The first three causes are similar to those of the 
Great Depression to some extent. On the other hand , however, the 
trend of deregulation and globalization played an important part in 
the first two causes. In addition , the fourth cause was peculiar to 
Japan and the source of the extraordinary speculation in lands. 
The increase in latent capital 당ains made the financial posi디ons 
of household , corporate. and banking sectors much more favorable 
and accelerated the exp밍lsion of real economy. Households 
increased their liabilities in order to expand residential investment 
and consumption of durable goods. 11 Non-financial corporate fimls 
also accumulated their liabilities to expand their investment ln 
assets induding lands and stockE‘. The apprecia디on of their assets 
made their financial position favorable. Small enterprises. 
paπicularly small non-manufacturing firms including real estate 
companies. increased liabilities to purchase lands and stocks. [n 
addition , corporate firms expanded capacity-increasing investment 
in plant and equipment in the second half of this decade because 
of a rise in effective demand. Banks expanded their loans , as the 
increase in latent capital gains of stocks enlarged their credit 
creation power. 
In this way, overheating of the bubble economy accelerated the 
exp밍lsion of the real economy 없ld the accumulation of capital 
stocks. Conversely, the expansion of the real economy supported 
"Household propensity to consume rose from 83.9% in 1986 to 85.9 in 
1990 (BO<J 1993. p. 38). In addition. the annuaI gro、따h rate of consumer 
instaIlment credit outstan이ng at commerciaI banks increased from 27.0% in 
1985 to 81.3% in 1988 (BOJ 1990. p. 73). 
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the rise in prices of stocks and lands. This short-term beneficial 
cycle was developed. On the other hand. however. unequal 
distribution of assets was exp없lded. πlis inequality made the 
people who had no land assets frustrated and increased social 
conflict. Under these conditions. a series of 디방lt money p이icies 
were adopted to restrict loans for land specula디on and then 삼le 
prices of lands and stocks began to decline. 
Asset deflation caused debt deflation and the following vicious 
circle was developed. <Decline of land pπces→deprecia디on of firms' 
tangible assets• decline of stock prices→deprecia디on of banks' 
capital (increase in banks bad assets) • decline in bank loans• 
decline in effective demand• deterioration of recession • decline in 
asset prices• deterioration of firms' and households' financial 
positions• decline in effective demand>. As the speculation in 
stocks and lands stimulated 야le expansion of investment and 
consump디on and accelerated the accumulation of capital stocks by 
the end of 1980s. the burst of the bubble economy made the 
volume of the capital stocks excessive. The necessity to adjust 
capital stocks and balance sheets of firms 밍ld households was an 
important factor that worsened the ongoing recession. 
Not only banks and debtor firms but also the financial 
authorities acted to conceal bad assets. As a result. a financial 
crisis did not occur. However. the disposal of bad assets was 
prolonged. For example. the debtor firms made paper companies 
and shifted debts to them. Banks and the financial authorities gave 
a tacit approval to manipulate their balance sheets. The increase in 
foreign fear of concealed bad assets caused a decline in prices of 
bank stocks and increased the "Japan premium" in the Euro-dollar 
markets. The deterioration of fund raising conditions for the 
Japanese banks caused a huge supply of the yen funds by the 
Bank of Japan. which were converted to the dol1ar funds. As a 
result. the yen exchange rate against the dol1ar depreciated after 
1995. This depreciation of the yen was one of the factors that 
precipitated the financial crises in the Asian countries. which 
increased bad assets in the Jap밍lese banks. 
IV. Conclusion 
The institutional causes of the bubble economy in Japan in the 
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late 1980s follow: (1) instability of the intemational monetary 
system , 1[2) transfonnation of the financial system from "regula디on 
and relief" to “ deregulation and relief," (3) transformation of 
industrial relations and unequal distribution of wealth , (4) the 
Japanese domestic institutions such as the cross-shareh이di 맹 
system , the tax system to stimulate borro뼈ng for land specula디on‘ 
“ the landl standard ," and the underdeveloped welfare system , 
These institutional factors are currently obstruc디ng econornic 
recovery in this Heisei era depression , (1) Financial crises in the 
Asian countries had a negative impact on the Japanese econorny. 
(2) On one hand , the financial system of “deregula디on and relief" 
prevented the financial crisis. On the other hand , this systfm 
prolonged the disposal of bad assets and prevented the Japanese 
economy from recovering. (3) The transfonnation of industrial 
relations to the superiori양 of management over labor reduced 
demand for consumption. The fear of unemployment and wage 
decline reduced consumption by households. This decline stagnated 
the Japanese economy. (4) The cross-shareholding system created a 
heavy b l.lrden on the Japanese corporate firms. The decline in 
stock prices deteriorated the financial posi디ons of the Japanese 
finns. The decline in stock prices also reduced bank credit in the 
“ land standard." The underdeveloped welfare system increased 
savings and reduced consump디on， which accelerated stagna디on 
during this depression. 
Therefore , we need to restructure these intemational and 
domestic institutions in order to recover from the current 
depression. (1) We need a stable intemational monetary system. :2) 
We can not assume that the financial system of “ deregulation a::1d 
no relief" or “ deregulation and limited relief," in other words , 
“ deregulation 밍1d self-responsibility" will be able to work well. 
According to the studies of American economic and financial 
history, the system of “ deregulation and no relief' led to the 
financial crisis of 1907 , and the system of “ deregulation and limited 
relief" resulted in the financüù crisis of 1929. We need to 
restructure the system of "regulation and relief." (3) We have to 
transform industrial relations to one of a cooperative system. (4) 
The cross-shareh이ding system will be 밍1d should be gradually 
disassembled. ‘“The land st없1dard" system should be removed. The 
current welfare system also should be refonned in order to rebuild 
the faith by the Japanese in the future of this system. 
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